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the assets mature, or “pay off.” Because
the yield curve is all about comparing
the effect of maturity on interest rates,
we want to plot the returns on assets that
are comparable along all dimensions
except the payoff date. For this reason,
the most common yield curve is the one
for U.S. Treasury securities. Treasury
securities tend to have similar default risk
(the probability of the U.S. government
reneging on its debt is really not much
higher in 10 years than in 3 months), they
are generally available in active sec-
ondary markets (making them easy to buy
and sell), and so on.
How are the yields on Treasury securities
that pay off in the short run related to the
yields on those that pay off further into
the future? For the answer, we usually
first look to the expectations theory of the
term structure. (Term structure is just
another way to refer to the yields on a col-
lection of assets that differ by maturity.)
The simplest version of the expectations
theory suggests a straightforward con-
nection between short-term and long-
term interest rates. Take, for example,
the relationship between returns to 
10-year Treasury notes and 1-year 
January 1, 2002*
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Why Haven’t Long-Term Interest Rates Fallen?
by  David E. Altig and Ed Nosal
ISSN 0428-1276
*Published March 2002
In 2001, the Federal Reserve lowered
the federal funds rate target more
than it had in over 25 years, but long-
term interest rates didn’t budge. Has
monetary policy become ineffective?
Just the opposite, the authors argue.
The stability of long-term rates shows
that people don’t expect inflation to
rise. That confidence, especially in
light of the dramatic shocks the 
economy experienced, attests to the
success of the central bank’s policies. 
On December 29, 2000, the yield on
10-year U.S. Treasury securities was 
5.12 percent. Within a week of that date,
the Federal Open Market Committee
convened a rare unscheduled meeting and
implemented the first in a rapid-fire string
of 11 reductions in the federal funds rate.
By the end of the year, the funds rate was
a full 475 basis points lower than at the
beginning, marking the rate’s largest 
12-month decline since 1975. 
Very-short-term market rates also fell,
but there was scant impact on long-term
interest rates. On December 28, 2001,
the yield on the 10-year Treasury note
was 5.15 percent, slightly higher than its
value at the beginning of the year. Long-
term interest rates did drift lower at cer-
tain points in the year, but most of the
effect was in the immediate aftermath of
September 11 and had dissipated by
year-end. 
How can this be? By conventional 
wisdom, reducing the funds rate by the
magnitude experienced last year should
have had some impact on longer-term
interest rates. Why hasn’t this happened?
Does it mean that monetary policy has
lost its effectiveness?
Quite the contrary. It is, paradoxically,
precisely because monetary policy has
been so effective in recent years that long
rates have failed to budge as short rates
have plunged. The effectiveness of mon-
etary policy is ultimately measured by
the central bank’s ability to provide liq-
uidity without raising the specter of infla-
tion, that is, without causing inflation
expectations to increase. As we review
2001, we see a policy environment that
continued to deliver the expectation of
stable inflation, and hence one in which
the behavior of market interest rates more
generally were wholly determined by
developments in the real economy. 
In our opinion, federal funds rate changes
throughout most of 2001 are best thought
of as the reactions required to keep policy
from becoming either inflationary or 
disinflationary. The onset of economic
weakness—beginning, roughly, in mid-
2000—created conditions that caused
market interest rates to sag. In addition,
coincident features of the economy—
reversals in the stock market, poor corpo-
rate earnings, rising unemployment—
elevated perceptions of risk, prompting
savers and lenders to prefer assets with
greater liquidity and shorter maturities.
This impulse inevitably drove down
short-term security yields relative to
those on longer-term assets. Because
inflation expectations remained stable,
these forces generated an environment in
which short rates (including the federal
funds rate) fell, and fell a lot, with rela-
tively little effect on rates at the longer
end of the maturity spectrum. In fact, we
argue that the lower funds rate was nec-
essary to justify the belief that the infla-
tion outlook would be little changed.
Implicit in the logic of this story is a 
prediction about the future course of
market interest rates. If recession and
wobbly confidence have driven interest
rates down (especially short-term rates),
recovery and restored confidence will,
sooner or later, drive them up. 
■ The Yield Curve: A Few
Preliminaries
Our interpretation of interest rate devel-
opments over the past year—and our
sense of what the future might bring—
spring from a simple conventional the-
ory of the yield curve. Before proceed-
ing to the details of our story, then, some
brief comments on yield curve theory
are in order.
A yield curve is a plot of the returns to
securities that differ in terms of the num-
ber of months or years in the future thatTreasury bills. The yield on the 10-year
note should equal the average expected
yield on a sequence of 1-year Treasury
bills in the 10-year period over which
the note matures. 
Why should this be so? Suppose it were
otherwise. Suppose, in particular, that
the yield on 10-year notes were to fall
below the yield investors expect to get
by buying 1-year bills this year, cashing
them in and buying new 1-year securi-
ties next year, rolling over those pro-
ceeds, and so on over the entire 10-year
horizon. The demand for the longer-
maturity asset would obviously fall, as
savers would choose the sequence of
short-term security acquisitions that they
expect will have a higher return. The
decline in demand, however, will drive
down the price of long-term securities,
thus raising the interest rate on the
longer-term assets. These sorts of mar-
ket forces will remain in play until the
interest rate on the 10-year note is equal
to the expected return on the sequence
of 1-year bills—in other words, until the
yield on a 10-year note equals the aver-
age of yields on 1-year bills. 
The expectations theory suggests that,
on average, the yield curve ought to be
flat. To say that the annualized long-
term interest rates are literally the aver-
age of expected annualized short-term
interest rates is to say that the yields are
independent of maturity. But the yield
curve is not typically flat. On average, it
slopes upward, like curve A in figure 1.
The simple expectations theory needs to
be augmented to account for saver pref-
erences, which favor shorter-term assets. 
In the augmented version of our term
structure theory, long-term interest rates
are equal to the average of expected
short-term rates plus a premium to com-
pensate savers for their preference to
hold assets that have shorter maturities.
One reason that people might have such
preferences is that there is an element of
liquidity provided by an asset that pays
off sooner rather than later. Keep this in
mind, as it plays a key role in our story.
■ Why Does the Yield Curve
Look Like it Does?
With the theory of the yield curve in
hand, we can turn to the more interest-
ing question of why the structure of
market interest rates looks like it does at
any particular point in time. The aug-
mented expectations theory tells us that,
on average, the yield curve should have
a positive slope (as in the stylized yield
curve A in figure 1). It does not of itself,
unfortunately, provide us with very
much insight regarding the height (or
position) of the curve, nor how steep it
should be. So what, then, would change
the position and shape of this curve? 
Consider first a situation in which the
economy suffers a permanent loss in the
pace at which the productivity of capital
expands. If we assume, for the sake of
argument, that such a loss does not alter
savers’sense of risk, the answer seems
pretty straightforward. A negative shock
to productivity growth will reduce the
return to capital. If the change is perma-
nent, the impact on capital returns will be
permanent, and we would expect to see
the entire yield curve shift downward, as
illustrated by curve B in figure 1.
Things get a bit more complicated when
the shortfall in productivity growth is only
temporary, but our basic point 
doesn’t really change. Negative shocks
will cause the yield curve to shift down.
The more persistent the downturn, the
more the impact on interest rates will look
like the shift from curve A to curve B.  
It is unlikely, of course, that the adverse
environment we have been describing
would leave savers’sense of risk unal-
tered, and one consequence of a down-
turn may very well be a heightened pref-
erence for relatively liquid assets. In the
context of the term structure, this change
in preferences would manifest itself in a
greater demand for short-term securities
relative to longer-term securities. Simple
supply and demand logic then suggests
that the price of the former will rise rela-
tive to the price of the latter. In other
words, interest rates on Treasuries with
shorter maturities will fall relative to
those with longer maturities, and the
yield curve will twist, as illustrated by
comparing curve B to curve C in figure 1. 
All this might be an academic discussion
except for the fact that over the course of
last year the economy entered recession
and corporate profit expectations fal-
tered. The world also appeared to be a
decidedly more uncertain place. Just as
we would suspect, during this period the
yield curve in the United States shifted
down and twisted. These dynamics were
solidly underway before September 11,
as can be seen in figure 2. They acceler-
ated thereafter. 
The preceding explanation assumes that
inflation expectations are fixed. But
because interest rates incorporate these
expectations, changes in the anticipated
pace of price-level growth will indepen-
dently affect the shape and position of
the yield curve. For example, if people
expect inflation to be higher, interest
rates will rise at all maturities (and quite
likely more at the longer end of the yield
curve than at the shorter end). Given that
changes in inflation expectations can
have an impact on the term structure,
why do we assume these expectations
are fixed? Because, we argue, this 
best describes the environment of the
past year. 
■ Has Monetary Policy Lost
Its Juice?
Some will be tempted to look at figure 2
and conclude that the Federal Open Mar-
ket Committee’s actions in 2001 have
not been particularly successful. That
would certainly be an understandable
conclusion if you held the belief that the
hallmark of a productive monetary pol-
icy is its ability to manipulate the course
of market interest rates and, through this
channel, stimulate total spending.
There is, however, another view. In this
view, the dynamics of economic activity
can have less to do with deficient spend-
ing than with the fundamental forces
driving productivity, forces that mone-
tary policy cannot reliably (or usefully)
alter. If you need some convincing,
think dot-com bust (the almost
overnight realization that a lot of what
was thought to be productive capital
wasn’t), ask yourself whether monetary
policy could have avoided or alleviated
the resulting market carnage, and you’ll
get the basic idea. (For a more extensive
treatment of this topic, see this Bank’s
2001 Annual Report essay.) 
In this view, the hallmark of a produc-
tive monetary policy is one that does no
harm. In other words, a productive mon-
etary policy maintains the expectation of
price stability while neither artificially
restraining nor stimulating the pace of
economic activity. If economic recovery
awaits resource reallocation and market
adjustment, then the appropriate mone-
tary policy is the one that delivers an
environment in which the real economy
can do its thing. 
How do we know when this environment
has been delivered? There, of course, is
the rub, but among the necessary condi-
tions would certainly be the maintenance
of economic conditions in which neither
strong inflationary nor strong disinfla-
tionary (or even deflationary) pressures
emerge. In such an environment, the
behavior of the yield curve would take
on the character of the real economy. In
such an environment, the course of the
yield curve might very well look like fig-
ure 2. And, it is worth emphasizing, in
such an environment monetary neutral-
ity—a policy that does no harm—is
almost certainly inconsistent with an
unchanging federal funds rate. ■ Crystal Ball Time
We’ll make a fearless prediction. The
recovery will come. In fact, at the time
of this writing there are an increasing
number of learned observers who
believe that the recession has come and
gone. If so, it is entirely reasonable to
expect to see the pattern of interest rates
that developed in 2001 reverse. If the
dropping and twisting of the yield curve
was, as we suggest, an archetypal
response to diminished productivity
growth and flagging confidence, a
bounce back in both will likely bring a
rise in short rates relative to long rates. 
tend to drive market interest rates
higher, the funds rate must also rise. The
central bank can, of course, attempt to
resist the tide and keep the funds rate
fixed. Such a policy, however, can only
be achieved by a more rapid expansion
in the money supply. This will, in the
end, do nothing to staunch the rise in
interest rates. If anything, it will con-
tribute to yet higher interest rates by
creating inflation. 
Federal funds futures currently reveal
that market participants believe higher
funds rate targets will arise sooner
rather than later (although some care
must be taken in the interpretation—see
the article “How Well Does the Federal
Funds Futures Rate Predict the Federal
Funds Rate?” cited in our recommended
reading). When rates do begin to rise,
there will no doubt be much commen-
tary about the FOMC’s tightening of
monetary policy to reign in growth.
Expect headlines like “Fed Punch Bowl
Police Bust Up Party!” This will be, in
our view, exactly wrong. 
In an environment like last year’s, when
the dynamics of the real economy were,
of their own momentum, driving short-
term interest rates south, a monetary
environment conducive to recovery
could not have been achieved without
reductions in the federal funds rate. But
the argument is symmetric, and, as the
forces in the real economy begin to
move interest rates in the opposite direc-
tion, adjustments in the funds rate will
be inevitable. Doing nothing—keeping
the funds rate artificially low—means
we would be abandoning policies con-
sistent with monetary neutrality. If
adjustments prove necessary because of
market rate developments, the punch
bowl headlines may come, but we hope
for something better: Fed Raises Rates;
Lets Growth Happen.
■ Recommended Reading:
Ed Nosal, “How Well Does the Federal
Funds Futures Rate Predict the Federal
Funds Rate?” Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland, Economic Commentary,
October 1, 2001.
“Rhetoric Aligned with Theory:  Talk-
ing Productively About Interest Rates,”
2001 Annual Report, Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, forthcoming 2002.
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FIGURE 1  SOME STYLIZED YIELD CURVES
FIGURE 2  THE SHIFTING AND TWISTING YIELD CURVE
The reason that interest rates would
rise as the economy expands is quite
simple. As the economy turns around,
productivity recovers. Higher produc-
tivity growth means better investment
opportunities, and better investment
opportunities mean heightened demand
for investment funds. Those funds, of
course, must be coaxed from the pock-
ets of savers, and it is higher interest
rates that do the trick.
These dynamics have direct conse-
quences for the level of the funds rate
that would be consistent with monetary
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